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DEAD-END STREET: DISCRIMINATION, THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND SECTION 1982
City of Memphis v. Greene
451 U.S. 100 (1981)
One hundred and fifteen years have passed since the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.1 The purpose of the Act was to insure
that the abolition of slavery2 was accomplished in fact as well as in
theory3 and to implement the protections afforded by the thirteenth
1. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976)).
2. The first African Blacks in the British North American colonies were brought ashore at
Jamestown in 1619. Between the American Revolution and the Civil War, the United States
became a nation that was, as Abraham Lincoln observed, "half slave and half free." Speech by
Abraham Lincoln, Republican State Convention, Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858), reprinted in
D. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS 258 (1981).
The most important judicial precedent on slavery at the founding of our republic was the
British case of Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), in which the court ruled that a
slave brought to England could not be forced to leave the realm. The slave could apply for a writ
of habeas corpus if forcible removal was attempted. In 1827, Somerset was limited by The Slave,
Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827). Grace had lived in England and later returned to the
West Indies where she sued for freedom. The court held that "Grace had been entitled to her
freedom only while in England; when she returned to a slave jurisdiction her status as a slave
reattached itself to her." See P. FINKLEMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 16 (1981).
The impact of these cases on American courts can be found in such cases as Lemmon v. The
People, 26 Barb. 270, aff'd, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860) and Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859). For an
exceptional analysis of the impact of the institution of slavery on federalism and comity see P.
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1981). The author points out that the most important legacy
of Lemmon, Wells, and Dred Scott is the fourteenth amendment. However, it is the thirteenth
amendment that directly prohibits "slavery" or "involuntary servitude".
In 1857, the United States Supreme Court furthered the institution of slavery by holding that
no black could be a United States citizen or even a state citizen "within the meaning of the Consti-
tution" and that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories, and, thus, all legisla-
tion embodying such prohibition, including the Missouri Compromise, was unconstitutional.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). It was decisions like Dred Scott, hotly
condemned by the North and satisfactorily accepted by the South, that contributed to the config-
uration of forces and events that produced the Civil War. See generally D. FEHRENBACHER,
SLAVERY, LAW AND POLITICs (1981).
3. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1866):
[The Thirteenth Amendment] declared that all persons in the United States should
be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that declaration and secure to all
persons within the United States practical freedom. There is very little importance in the
general declaration of abstract truths and principles unless they can be carried into effect,
unless the persons who are to be affected by them have some means of availing them-
selves of their benefits. . . . And of what avail will it now be that the Constitution of the
United States has declared that slavery shall not exist, if in the late slaveholding States
laws are to be enacted and enforced depriving persons of African descent of privileges
which are essential to freemen?
It is the intention of this bill to secure those rights.
Id. at 474 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
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amendment.4 When Congress enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, it intended "to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or
not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated
therein. . . ." These enumerated rights include the rights "to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property."
6
For almost a century, both section 1982, the codification of section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the thirteenth amendment lay
relatively dormant, unused by civil rights litigants.7 In particular, the
history of the thirteenth amendment indicates that it had never lived up
to its historic promise as the "grand yet simple declaration of the per-
sonal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this
government."
'8
This dormancy may have occurred, in part, as a result of the
Supreme Court decisions in the Civil Rights Cases,9 Plessy v. Fergu-
son,l1 and Hodges v. United States,I I which progressively contracted
See also J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 174-97 (rev. ed. 1965).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865) provides:
Section I
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), was considered as a
legislative implementation of section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. See note 2, supra (remarks
of Sen. Trumbull). See generally tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States., Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171
(1951):[hereinafter cited as Consummation.]
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). See also Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 435-37 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 235-37 (1969). The genesis of both sections 1981 and 1982 was section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, which was passed pursuant to the enforcement clause of
the thirteenth amendment. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-38.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1978) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.
7. Historically, plaintiffs relying on the thirteenth amendment to validate their claims have
generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883) and discussion in note 12, infra. For almost a century sections 1981 and 1982
lay dormant because they were assumed to have been intended to apply only to state action. See
Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedyfor Racial Discrimination in Private Employ-
ment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56, 57 (1972); Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially
Neutral Practices-What Approach Under 42 U.S C Sections 1981 and 19827, 1977 DUKE L.J.
1267, 1274 [hereinafter cited as Impact.]
8. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873).
9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court sustained a Louisiana law of 1890 that required "equal
but separate accommodations for white" and "colored" railroad passengers. The majority found
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the reach of congressional power under the amendment. Designed for
the sweeping purpose of granting the right of freedom, very few liti-
gants had successfully invoked it, 12 except in attacks on peonage.'
3
However, in 1948, in Hurd v. Hodge,14 the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the disregarded statute by holding that a Negro
citizen who is denied the opportunity to purchase the home he wants
"[s]olely because of [his] race and color," has suffered the kind of injury
that section 1982 was designed to prevent.' 5 In 1968, this holding was
reinforced in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 16 Writing for a majority of
seven in Jones, Justice Stewart reaffirmed that section 1982 was derived
from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was designed to bar all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of prop-
erty.' 7 As such, section 1982 was a valid exercise of the power of Con-
gress to enforce the thirteenth amendment. In sustaining the
constitutionality of section 1982 under the thirteenth amendment, the
Jones decision resurrected the "badge of slavery" concept buried by
the court in 1883 in the CivilRights Cases, holding that "Congress has
the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to
the thirteenth amendment inapplicable in this situation. (The Plessy separate-but-equal doctrine
was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
11. 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).)
12. See Consummation, supra note 4, at 171. See also Buchanan, The Questfor Freedom: A
Legal History ofthe Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1974); Buchanan, The Dormant
Years ofthe Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 593 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dormant
Years.] Professor Buchanan authored a series of eight articles comprehensively examining the
history and general scope of the thirteenth amendment in 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 331, 357, 593, 610,
844, 871, 1070 (1975). The amendment is not broad enough, the Supreme Court has held, to
protect blacks against being driven from their job by force and terror (Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906)); to prevent color discrimination in the use of public conveyances, hotels and
theaters (The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)); to condemn covenants forbidding the transfer
of land to persons of black descent (Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926)); to authorize Con-
gress to punish those who conspire for the purpose of depriving any person of the equal protection
of the laws (United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).)
13. Under the aegis of the thirteenth amendment, peonage compulsory labor for debt was
invalidated as a legal institution in New Mexico by act of Congress in 1867. Statutes of Alabama,
Georgia and Florida, which made it a criminal offense to obtain advances of money, under a
promise to perform labor were invalidated later. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944);
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). See also Consum-
mation, supra note 4, at 171-72.
14. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The case arose when property owners in the District of Columbia
sought to enforce racially restrictive covenants against the Negro purchases of several homes on
their block. The Court held that enforcement of those covenants would deny the Negro purchas-
ers "the same right 'as is enjoyed by white citizens... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."' Such result is prohibited by § 1982. Id. at 34.
15. Id.
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Id. at 422-36.
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translate that determination into effective legislation."' 8 Thus, the
Jones Court affirmed the power of Congress to define the substantive
scope of the thirteenth amendment and effectively revitalized the thir-
teenth amendment and section 1982 as successful civil rights weap-
ons. 19 The Court further expanded the use of the badge of slavery
analysis in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. 20 and Tillman v. Whea-
ton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,21 applying it to racially restrictive cove-
nants and discriminatory policies of private clubs.
The major issue not addressed by these cases was whether con-
duct, racially neutral on its face, which resulted in racially dispropor-
tionate impact, was statutorily prohibited by section 1982 or
constitutionally prohibited by the thirteenth amendment. 22 This issue
of discriminatory purpose has arisen most often in conjunction with
recent cases concerning the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 23 Since 1976, the Supreme Court has held that proof of
discriminatory purpose is necessary to establish a claim under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24
18. Id. at 440.
19. See Dormant Years, supra note 12, at 597. The Court in Jones recognized that the badge-
of-slavery concept embraces more than state laws that deprive a class of persons of the legal
capacity to function in society; the concept also includes the private acts of class prejudice that
render legal capacity an illusion. The Court concluded:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thir-
teenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right
to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man
means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation
cannot keep.
392 U.S. at 443.
20. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Sullivan involved a successful claim based on § 1982 where the
Court struck down a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive covenant. The Court
noted that "a narrow construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the
broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which § 1982 was derived." Id. at 237, citing Jones, 392 U.S. at 422-37.
21. 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (private swimming club's discriminatory guest policy invalidated
under Acts of 1866 and 1870).
22. It should be noted that the problems of identifying unconstitutional purposeful discrimi-
nation arise in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (first
amendment); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (Commerce Clause).
23. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The case involved the validity of a qualifying
test administered to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia Metro-
politan Police Department. The disproportionate impact of this test which was neutral on its face
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Court in City of Memphis v. Greene25 granted certiorari 26 to
determine whether proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
necessary in thirteenth amendment or section 1982 cases27 (as is now
required under the fourteenth amendment 28). However, the majority
found it unnecessary to reach these issues. Instead, the Court reexam-
ined the record at length and set aside the court of appeals' interpreta-
tion of facts, holding that a street closing at the border between a white
and a black neighborhood did not involve any impairment to the kind
of property interests within the reach of section 1982.29
This case comment will focus on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Greene. The comment will place the decision in perspective through a
brief review of pertinent discrimination cases as well as a review of the
background of the Memphis litigation. The Greene holding will then
be presented and analyzed. This comment will question the rationale
and viability of the Greene decision, particularly in relation to the di-
lemma posed when facially neutral conduct has discriminatory impact
but lacks intent or purpose (racial animus). Finally, this comment will
consider the decision's impact on future civil rights litigation.
RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF FACIALLY NEUTRAL
PRACTICES: AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
During the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has handed
down several important decisions concerning the elements of a prima
facie case of statutory or constitutional race discrimination.30 A yet
did not warrant a conclusion that the test was a purposefully discriminatory device. Id. at 246.
See note 46 infra.
25. 451 U.S. 100 (1981), rehearing denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981).
26. 446 U.S. 934 (1980).
27. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. Supp. 1981) 111.
28. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
29. 451 U.S. at 119-24.
30. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discriminatory intent proved by a showing
that Mexican-Americans constituted only 39 percent of those called for grand jury duty over an 11
year period in a county with a 79 percent Mexican-American population); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the equal protection clause); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination
against white as well as non-white persons); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section
1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, non-sectarian schools from denying admission to
prospective students because they are black); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the equal protection
clause as applied through the fifth amendment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids the use of neutral practices with racially dispro-
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unresolved issue is whether a plaintiff alleging a violation of section
198231 must prove discriminatory intent or, instead, may, in the proper
circumstances, rely solely upon a showing of racially disproportionate
impact.32 Since the Court has not directly addressed the issue of intent
under section 1982 or thirteenth amendment cases, 33 the Court must
portionate effects unless they are job related); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(section 1982 provides a remedy against purely private acts of race discrimination).
31. See Impact, supra note 7, at 1268 n.3, where the author stated:
Despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, section 1982 is still important because it is applica-
ble to transactions involving personal as well as real property and it is capable of reach-
ing those transactions exempted from the reach of Title VIII: the sale or rental of a
single family dwelling if effected without the services of a professional realtor of public
advertising and if the owner of the dwelling does not own an interest in more than three
such dwellings and has not invoked such an exemption within the previous twenty-four
month period; the rental of rooms or units in a dwelling, in which the owner resides and
in which not more than four families reside independently of each other, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b) (1976); and the rental of rooms by religious groups and private clubs to their
own members. Id. § 3607.
[Slections 1981 and 1982 have been given a parallel interpretation by the Supreme
Court. The Court first indicated that it would do so in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968), in which it explicated section 1982. The Court discussed an older deci-
sion in which the Supreme Court had held that the predecessor to section 1981 was
applicable only to state action. Instead of merely distinguishing that case, the Court
expressly overruled it, thus establishing a parallel interpretation for the two sections. See
id. at 441 note 78. This initial disposition was solidified by the Court's decision in Run-
n v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("it would
most incongruous to give those two sections a fundamentally different construction").
32. See Impact, supra note 7, at 1268 n.4, where it says:
An allegation of racial discrimination may take either of two forms. The first is an alle-
ation of [intentional] disparate treatment--that the defendant has treated the plaintiff
ess favorably than others because of the plaintiff's race. The second form, dispropor-
tionate impact, alleges a less obvious type of racial discrimination. It charges that the
defendant has discriminated against the plaintiff by utilizing, in a racially neutral man-
ner, a selection device or criterion that, although racially neutral on its face, nonetheless
operates to the detriment of a disproportionate number of minority persons.
33. The Court's modem section 1982 and thirteenth amendment cases have all dealt with
intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431
(1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court has not had the occasion to comment on the proper standard in an
effect case. Justice Stewart's opinion in Jones did state that section 1982 "must encompass every
racially motivated refusal to sell or rent" 392 U.S. at 421-22, but nothing was said about practices
with discriminatory effects that were not racially motivated.
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court discussed section 1982 with
reference to its origin in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and concluded that "the struc-
ture of the 1866 Act, as well as its language, points to the conclusion urged by the petitioners in
this case--that § 1 was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumer-
ated in the statute . I. " d. 426. This is a strong indication of the Court's thinking as to the
character of the actions prohibited by the Act. Compare a similar discussion found in Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), another case involving allegations of disparate treatment. There
the Court, while discussing section 1981 by reference to section 1 of the 1866 Act, stated that
Ulust as in Jones a Negro's § I right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was
violated when a private person refused to sell to the prospective purchaser solely because
he was a Negro, so also a Negro's § I right to "make and enforce contracts" is violated if
a private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same
opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.
Id. at 170-71. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This result seems to be mandated by the
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decide whether to adopt the same approach it has taken in equal pro-
tection cases or the alternate approach it has taken in Title VIP 4 cases.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case under Title VII merely
by proving that he was damaged by the effect of an employment prac-
tice that, although neutral on its face, is shown to have a racially dis-
proportionate impact.35 On the other hand, to establish a prima facie
case under the equal protection clause a plaintiff must produce proof of
the defendant's intent to discriminate.
36
Prior to 1976,37 the issue of finding discriminatory intent did not
arise often, as discriminatory intent was often blatantly clear from the
statute or behavior in question. Nor did plaintiffs appear to have to
show discriminatory intent by the defendants as a prerequisite to estab-
lishing a violation of the equal protection clause. Because this showing
was not required, plaintiffs' burden in discrimination cases was not too
great. Thus, the fourteenth amendment was invoked, often success-
fully, not only in school desegregation cases,38 but also in municipal
service,39 voting,40 housing,41 zoning,42 jury selection, 43 public accom-
definition of a disparate treatment charge; that the defendant acted as he did because of plaintifi's
race necessarily implies action motivated by discriminatory feelings, that is, subjective intent.
34. Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, codified at, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
35. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and notes 50-53 infra and accompa-
nying text.
36. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
and note 59 infra.
37. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
38. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court overturned the
separate-but-equal doctrine espoused in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), holding that
segregation of white and black children in state public schools solely on the basis of race and
pursuant to state laws permitting such segregation, denies to black children the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Further, even though the physical facilities
and other tangible factors of white and black schools may be equal, the doctrine of separate-but-
equal has no place in the field of public education; separate is inherently unequal.
39. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). In Detiege,
the Court affirmed per curiam the decision of the fifth circuit (252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958)) that
the refusal of a city to make publicly supported facilities available on a non-segregated basis to
black citizens deprived them of equal protection of the law.
40. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1971-1973 (1970). In Gomillion, some Alabama black citizens sued for a declaratory
judgment that an act of the state legislature changing the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee is
unconstitutional and for an injunction against its enforcement. The Court held that since the
inevitable effect of the act would be to deprive blacks of their right to vote on account of their race,
contrary to the fifteenth amendment, the act was unconstitutional.
41. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (a facially neutral law that burdens minorities is
as repugnant for equal protection purposes as a law that discriminates on its face).
42. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Court held that a city ordinance which
forbids blacks to occupy houses in blocks where the greater number of houses are occupied by
whites, in practical effect, prevents the sale of lots in such blocks to blacks, thereby violating the
fourteenth amendment.
43. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). A West Virginia statute which in effect,
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modation 44 and property45 cases. However, it should be noted that
most of these cases dealt with conduct that was obviously racially moti-
vated rather than facially neutral.
The Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Davis46 in 1976, be-
gan a new era in civil rights law.47 Rejecting the contention that state
action is unconstitutional solely because it operates to injure more
blacks than whites, the Court held that proof of discriminatory purpose
is necessary to establish a claim of racial discrimination under the
equal protection clause. 48 The Court rejected the Title V11 49 standard
announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,5o which prohibited the use of
"practice that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 5'
singles out and denies to blacks the right and privilege of participating in the administration of
law, as jurors, because of their color, is discrimination forbidden by the fourteenth amendment.
44. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (denial of equal accommodations to blacks in
an inn, a theater, and a railroad imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude violative of
the thirteenth amendment, but, at most, infringes rights which are protected from state aggression
by the fourteenth amendment).
45. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
46. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The case involved the validity of a qualifying test administered to
applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment. Davis contended that the use of the test discriminated against blacks in the hiring and
promotion of police officers. The Court held that a law or other official act is not unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. Id. at 239. "Disproportionate impact is
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution." Id. at 242. The Court held the test was not a "purposeful device" to discrimi-
nate against blacks but a test "neutral on its face" which "rationally may be said to serve a pur-
pose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue." Id. at 246.
Some contrary indications may be drawn from earlier cases--hat proof of racially discrimi-
natory intent is not required to show a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 242. See,
e.g., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 225 (1971). However, the Davis court did not find these cases persuasive on this issue.
47. 426 U.S. at 242. See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond- Dis-
criminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 961 [hereinafter cited as
Discriminatory Purpose.] Civil rights leaders recognized that Washington v. Davis was a
landmark case and viewed its holding with dismay. One commentator called it "perhaps the
single worst decision of the past 80 years," probably referring to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). McDonald, Has the Supreme Court Abandoned the Constitution?, SATURDAY REVIEW,
May 28, 1977 at 10. Mr. McDonald was then director of the southern regional office of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union Foundation in Atlanta.
48. 426 U.S. at 239-46.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1979), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253.
Title VII was designed as a comprehensive plan to combat discrimination in employment.
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, blacks challenged the power company's policy requiring
that applicants have a high school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order to be considered
for employment or transfer to higher paying jobs.
51. Id. at 431. The Griggs' Court examined the statute's legislative history and concluded
that the purpose of Congress was "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." Id. Accordingly, the Court held that:
good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability. . . .Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that, Con-
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Under the Griggs statutory standard, a plaintiff alleging disproportion-
ate impact need not show that the practice was motivated by discrimi-
natory intent, but an inference of such motive is created.5 2 The Griggs
ruling prompted a wide application of its new evidentiary dispropor-
tionate impact theory in neutral factor race discrimination cases
brought under a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions.
5 3
Davis dramatically interrupted this trend.5 4 The Supreme Court in Da-
vis declined to apply the Griggs approach because it decided that to do
so would raise serious issues of public policy that are traditionally the
province of the legislature and would inevitably lead to the invalida-
tion of a whole range of statutes.
55
Thus, under Davis, disproportionate impact is relevant only for the
purpose of proving the presence of subjective 56 discriminatory intent.
57
gress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
52. The Griggs Court repeatedly emphasized that Title VII's disproportionate impact stan-
dard originated in the language and purpose of the statute. Id. at 429-31. See also Impact, supra
note 6.
53. See Discriminatory Purposes, supra note 47, at 987-1000; Note, Burden of Proof in Equal
Protection Discriminatory Impact Cases- An Emerging Standard, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 815, 817-21
(1977).
Commenting on the broad application the lower courts had given to Griggs, Judge Lambros
observed in Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1978):
In restrospect and in light of Washington v. Davis . . . it is now apparent that the
federal courts, in their eagerness to redress some of the effects of a long history of racial
discrimination in this country, had not made the necessary fine distinctions among
claims brought under Title VII, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985, and/or under the equal
protection clause.
54. In footnote 12 of Davis, Justice White, author of the majority opinion, noted the Court's
disagreement with some 18 cases dealing with employment discrimination, urban renewal, zoning,
public housing, and municipal services that had improperly applied the disproportionate impact
standard. 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
55. 426 U.S. at 248. The Court stated:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that maybe
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than- to the more affluent white.
Id. (footnote omitted).
56. Subjective discriminatory intent is one that does not expressly appear on the face of a
statute. However, a statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so its effect is to
discriminate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 241 (1976).
57. Id. at 242. The Court in Davis went on to make clear that in some situations a showing of
disproportionate impact will be so suspicious as to constitute proof of intent:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory
impact ... may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in
various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial
grounds.
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Post-Davis cases attempted to establish a standard for proving the pres-
ence of subjective discriminatory intent and for according different pro-
bative value to the evidence of intent according to the circumstances
under which it occurs. 58 The Court has applied this standard to zon-
ing,59 school desegregation, 60 jury selection,6' and employment dis-
crimination62 cases.
In recent years, the intent-impact issue has assumed major signifi-
cance in civil rights cases. The issue of burden of proof 63 in racial dis-
crimination actions has generated a continuing debate for the Supreme
Court and lower courts since Davis.64 Lower courts have divided on
whether to align the intended protection of the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1870 with the constitutional Davis standard (intent) or with
the Title VII-Griggs standard (impact).
65
58. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
60. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, (1977), where the Court stated:
"The finding that the pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not homogeneous, stand-
ing by itself, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this
condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the Board." Id. at 413,
citing, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
61. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discriminatory intent proved by a showing
that Mexican-Americans constituted only 39% of those called for grand jury duty over an 1 I-year
period in a county with a 79% Mexican-American population).
62. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). See Justice Powell's dissent, seek-
ing to determine "whether § 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, prohibits only purposefully discriminatory conduct." Id. at 647.
63. The discriminatory purpose theory promotes the value of equal treatment by condi-
tioning the plaintiffs right to prevail on proof that the defendant's act was prompted by
an improper motive. The plaintiff is not favored by a presumption of a generalized
injury originating at some distant place and time. The disproportionate impact theory,
on the other hand, compensates victims of past societal discrimination by easing the
burden of proof. It promotes the value of equal status by allowing the plaintiff to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination without reference to the defendant's good or bad
intentions. (footnote ommitted.)
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1870. Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1051
[hereinafter cited as Burden of Proo~q.
64. Burden of Proof, supra note 63 at 1030-31 Unhampered by many of the restrictive sub-
stantive and procedural limitations of other civil rights measures, § 1982, which derives from the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), potentially reaches discriminatory con-
duct not covered by any other statutory or constitutional provision. Id. at 1031-32.
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The 1870 Act was a fourteenth amend-
ment statute, and the 1866 Act was a thirteenth amendment statute. Id. at 205 (White, J., dissent-
ing). For a thorough analysis of the relationship between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
fourteenth amendment, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 22-36, 38-40, 46, 48, 50-51,
102-03, 179-80 (1977). See generally, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Deci-
sion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
65. Some courts have adopted the Davis standard. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners,
79 F.R.D. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (relief denied because no proof of intent as required by Davis and
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The Court attempted to promulgate much needed guidelines re-
garding burden of proof and to clarify its position on the fourteenth
amendment intent requirement in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp. 
66
In Arlington Heights, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
discriminatory purpose requirement 67 and offered some guidelines as to
how to shoulder the burden of proof in different contexts. "Determin-
ing whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evi-
dence of intent as may be available. ' 68 The impact of the official ac-
tion-whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another"69-
may provide an important starting point. 70 However, impact alone is
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)); Bacica v.
Board of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (termination of seniority status purposeful,
therefore planitiffs entitled to recover under §§ 1981 and 1983; cited Davis); Williams v. Ryan, 78
F.R.D. 364, 367 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (Davis "held that in suits brought under the 'Reconstruction Era'
civil rights acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a chal-
lenged employment practice is the result of an intent to discriminate"); Manica v. Chrysler Corp.,
83 Lab. Cas. 17,861 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (in the wake of Davis, "the courts have clearly held that a
[§ ] 1981 cause of action does not arise merely upon a showing of disparate impact" Id. at 17,868.);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), (since Davis
requires intent, "jilt follows that §§ 1981 and 1983 require the same showing" (footnotes omit-
ted)), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory
Therapy, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 6878, 6881 (N.D. IlL. 1977) (citing Davis § 1981, claim dis-
missed for failure to allege discriminatory purpose). See also Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp.
282, 284, 291-94 (D. Md. 1977) (dismissing action brought under §§ 1981 and 1983 because no
intentional discrimination was found) in the administration of the Maryland bar examination
which black plaintiffs claimed was racially discriminatory and deprived them of equal protection.
Other courts have concluded however, that "the burden of proving intentional or purposeful
discrimination required under a constitutional claim is not required" under a statutory claim.
Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133, 140 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (indicating the Griggs' standards are
applicable to § 1981.) See generally Burden of Proof, supra note 63, at 1040-43.
66. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Corporation, a non-profit developer, sued for injunctive and
declaratory relief against an allegedly unconstitutional refusal to rezone a piece of property in
order to permit construction of a housing development for low and moderate income persons.
The Seventh Circuit held that the city's action had a racially discriminatory effect and operated to
perpetuate the city's segregated character, violating equal protection, with no compelling justifica-
tion. 517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally, Note, Proving Discriminatory Intentfrom a
Facially Neutral Decision with a Discriminatory Impact, 36 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 109 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Discriminatory Intent].
67. 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court held that Metropolitan failed to carry its burden of prov-
ing that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose, required to show a violation of the fourteenth
amendment, was a motivating factor in the Village's rezoning decision. 429 U.S. at 264-71. For a
probing analysis of the difficulties in ascertaining and proving legislative motive, see Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.
REv. 95, 99-102. See also Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1213-14 (1970).
68. 429 U.S. at 266.
69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
70. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266-68. The
Court was referring to such "stark" patterns of racial discriminatory purpose, unexplainable on
other grounds, as could be found in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (an Alabama law
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usually not determinative, and the Court must look to other
evidence .7 t
One evidentiary source the Arlington Heights Court explores is the
historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series
of official actions taken for invidious purposes. 72 The Court further
examines the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision which may reveal the decisionmaker's purposes. 73 The Court
searches for substantive departures from the normal procedural se-
quence which would afford evidence that improper purpose played a
role.74 Finally, the Court examines the relevant legislative or adminis-
trative history, especially where there are contemporaneous statements
by members of the decisionmaking body. 75 These four factors compose
what is now known as the Arlington Heights standard of proof for
plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
The foregoing summary of the Arlington Heights evidentiary test
identifies the subjects of proper inquiry for determining whether a ra-
cially discriminatory intent exists. Taken together, Davis and Arlington
Heights indicate that the task of proving discriminatory purpose will be
difficult in all but the most egregious cases.76 The central question in-
volved in claims of covert racial discrimination is whether the focus in
such cases should be on the presence of a racially discriminatory pur-
pose on the part of the decisionmaker (as required by Davis and Arling-
ton Heights in constitutional claims) 77 or on the disproportionate
redefining the city boundaries of Tuskegee was a device to disenfranchise blacks in violation of
the fifteenth amendment) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (blatant discrimination in
the administration of a law-a Chinese laundryman was among the 200 Chinese applicants who
was refused a permit to operate a laundry).
71. 429 U.S. at 266. This evidentiary test and four others can be found at 429 U.S. at 266-68.
These tests include, as a relevant starting point, impact. Other factors the Court will examine are
legislative or administrative history, the specific sequence of events, and historical background.
72. 429 U.S. at 267. See, e.g., Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
73. 429 U.S. at 267. For example, if the property in issue had been zoned R-5 but was sud-
denly changed to R-3 when the village learned of the corporations' plans to erect integreted hous-
ing an inference of discriminatory motive can be drawn. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 373-76 (1967).
74. 429 U.S. at 267. See, e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (10th Cir.
1970).
75. Id. 429 U.S. at 268. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
76. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The fact that the Partida Court
voted only five to four to sustain the plaintiff's claim can hardly comfort those faced with the task
of proving discriminatory purpose in the future. See also Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 47, at
1048.
77. Recently, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court reiterated its position
that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 66-67. The Court further held that disproportionate
effects alone are insufficient to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution; racially
discrimiatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a fifteenth amendment violation. Id. at 61-
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impact of action taken under a facially neutral law or official decision
(as required by Griggs in statutory claims). These two different stan-
dards impose vastly different evidentiary burdens on the plaintiff's ini-
tial burden of proof.
78
Greene presented to the Court a situation where the discrimination
at issue involved a facially neutral practice-the closing of a public
street. This comment will explore the decision in the context of the
different evidentiary theories discussed in this section. Greene involved
section 1982 and thirteenth amendment claims (as in Jones), but the
Court examined these claims in the post-Jones context of Davis and
Arlington Heights fourteenth amendment holdings.
CITY OF MEMPHIS v GREENE
Factual Background
The litigation arose out of efforts by the residents of Hein Park, a
white subdivision located in Memphis, Tennessee, to close West Drive
at its northerly end so as to bar all through traffic.79 Hein Park was
65. In Bolden, black voters brought a class action suit alleging that the practice of electing the city
commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of blacks in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. But see, in Bolden, Justice Marshall's dissent. "[P]roof of racially discriminatory
impact should be sufficient to support a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 134 (em-
phasis added). Justice Marshall recognized that "[an approach based on motivation creates the
risk that officials will be able to adopt policies that are the products of discriminatory intent so
long as they sufficiently mask their motives through the use of subtlety and illusion." Id. at 135.
The fifteenth amendment states:
Section I. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XV.
See generally Gates, The Supreme Court and the Debate over Discriminatory Purpose and Dispro-
portionate Impact, 26 Loy. L. REV. 567 (1980).
78. See Burden of Proof, supra note 63, at 1039. This commentator notes:
[Tihere remains a crucial distinction between the impact and purpose theories in neutral
factor cases: under the first a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by simply showing a
racially disproportionate impact; under the second the plaintiff must show something
more than mere statistical disparity. The added burden under the purpose theory will
vary according to the facts of the case. If the plaintiff establishes extreme disproportion-
ate impact, additional evidence of discrimination may be unnecessary. In other cases,
however, the plaintiff may be required to produce evidence relating to the circumstances
of the decision, the statements or conduct of the decisionmaker, or the relative weight
given various factors in making the decision in order to establish a prima facie case.
Id. (footnoted omitted).
79. These and the following facts are reported in Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395,
396-97 (6th Cir. 1979) as found by the district court. See also Note, Greene v. City ofMemphis: Is
Intent the Sine Qua Non of Discrimination Claims?, 35 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1980) for an
exhaustive examination of the history and pertinent background of this case while it was on ap-
peal before the Supreme Court [hereinafter cited as Sine Qua Non].
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developed before World War I as an exclusive residential neighbor-
hood for white citizens and these characteristics have been maintained.
The northern boundary of Hein Park is Jackson Avenue which carries
a significant amount of commercial traffic. West Drive extends the
complete length of Hein Park, about one-half mile. Opposite West
Drive on the north side of Jackson Avenue is a major thoroughfare,
Springdale Street, which serves a sizeable area composed of black citi-
zens who will be "inconvenienced" by the closing of West Drive, since
Springdale Street is, in fact, a northward extension of West Drive.
The stated reasons for the closing were to reduce the flow of traffic
using Hein Park streets, to increase safety to children who live in Hein
Park or use the street to walk to school, and to reduce traffic pollution
in the residential area. The closing thus afforded the residents of Hein
Park the privacy and safety of living on a dead-end street.
Respondents, certain black individuals and members of a class of
black persons in the City of Memphis who own or stand to inherit
property immediately to the north of and adjoining Hein Park, at-
tempted to prevent the closing. They claimed that the closing of West
Drive deliberately created a barrier between the all-white Hein Park
subdivision and the predominantly black residential area to the north,
limiting access to their own residential area and impairing their prop-
erty values. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the city and various
officials contending that the closing violated their rights under the thir-
teenth and fourteenth amendments, and sought relief under sections
1982 and 1983. The district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim.80 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded,8' and held that the complaint that the
street closing conferred certain benefits on white residents (privacy and
quiet of an exclusive dead-end street) was entitled to be judicially
resolved.8
2
On remand, the district court ruled for the city because the differ-
ential treatment was not so "stark" that the court could infer a discrimi-
natory motive.8 3 The case was again brought on appeal to the Sixth
80. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Divi-
sion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and one plaintiff appealed. Greene v.
City of Memphis, No. 75-1339 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (reported at 535 F.2d 976, 977 (6th Cir. 1976)).
81. Greene v, City of Memphis, 535 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1976). The case was decided on May
13, 1976.
82. Id. at 980. "We view Greene as having stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id.
at 978. "According to the instant complaint .... the closing of West Drive left certain white
residents with privacy and quiet of a dead-end street, though black residents, for racial reasons,
have been and would be unable to acquire such a dead-end street." Id. at 980.
83. Sine Qua Non, supra note 79, at 132.
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Circuit.8 4 The court reversed and remanded, holding that the closing
of West Drive, in effect, erected a physical barrier between an histori-
cally all-white residential neighborhood and a black neighborhood and
had a disproportionate adverse impact upon certain blacks with regard
to noise, traffic, and reduction of property values. 85 In reaching its
holding, the court applied the evidentiary tests of Arlington Heights,
and found the challenged conduct a "stark" pattern of discrimination
and "in a very real sense a badge of slavery violative of the plaintiffs'
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment and subject to relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1982. ''86 After this decision, the city of Memphis petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari.8 7
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Maority Opinion.: The Sixth Circuit Reversed
When the appeal of City of Memphis v. Greene was presented to
the Supreme Court, the legal theories relied on by both petitioner and
respondent were basically the same as they had been since 1976.88 The
84. 610 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 403-405.
We are convinced that the erection of the physical barrier between a historically all-
white residential neighborhood and a predominantly black neighborhood under the par-
ticular circumstances found by the court here is precisely the type of "badge" which was
the target of the Thirteenth Amendment and of Section 1982. The broad reach of Sec-
tion 1982 was repeatedly emphasized by Mr. Justice Stewart in Jones, supra, 392 U.S. at
422-37, 88 S.Ct. 2186. As the Supreme Court later observed in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237, 90 S.Ct. 400, 404, 24 L.Ed. 2d 386 (1969), "[a] narrow construc-
tion of the language of § 1982 would be inconsistent with the broad and sweeping nature
of the protection meant to be afforded by [the Act]."
Id. at 403 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 402.
Because of our holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief under Section 1982,
we do not reach the question whether relief could be predicted directly on the Thirteenth
Amendment with the cause of action lying under Section 1983. Neither our circuit nor
the Supreme Court has decided this question. We note, however, that constitutional
rights other than those contained in the Fourteenth Amendment have been protected
under Section 1983. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson. 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281
(1939) (violation of Fifteenth Amendment remedied under R.S. § 1979, the predecessor
of Section 1983).
Id. at 402 n.8. But see App. Brief 161. District Court Judge McRae expressly found that the
respondents had not proved that the City Council had acted with discriminatory intent. See also
Judge Celebrezze's dissent, maintaining that section 1982 requires the same showing of discrimi-
natory intent as do claims based directly on the fourteenth amendment. 610 F.2d at 408.
87. 446 U.S. 934 (1980). (Motion of Hein Park Civic Ass'n for leave to file a brief as amicus
curiae granted. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari
granted.)
88. See 610 F.2d at 397. Respondents' original § 1983 claim based on the fourteenth amend-
ment fell on the district court's conclusion that they had failed to meet their burden of establishing
discriminatory intent. This claim was not presented to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
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question presented to the Court remained the same: whether a decision
by the city of Memphis to close the north end of West Drive violated 42
U.S.C. § 1982 or the thirteenth amendment.8 9 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the record
did not support the Sixth Circuit decision that the street closing was
"invalid" 90 because it adversely affected respondents' abijity to hold
and enjoy their property.9' The Sixth Circuit concluded also that the
unique circumstances of the street closing amounted to racial humilia-
tion that rose to the level of a "badge of slavery," violative of the thir-
teenth amendment. 92 The majority did not agree with this conclusion.
The majority opinion was divided into four parts. Before address-
ing the legal issues, the Court first devoted over half of its discussion to
an exhaustive examination of the relevant facts of the case and the in-
ferences to be drawn from them. Included in this analysis was an ex-
tended inquiry into the geography of the area, the history of the city
approval, the history of the litigation, and the evidentiary connection
between this information and the holdings of the district court and the
court of appeals.93 Second, the Court then reviewed recent decisions
concerning discriminatory intent.94 Third, the Court dealt with the
statutory question: whether the relationship between the street closing
and Greene's property interest was violative of section 1982. 95 Finally,
the Court considered whether the closing of West Drive violated the
thirteenth amendment.
96
After an inquiry into the geography of the area, the Court con-
cluded that the closing would have some effect on both through traffic
and local traffic. 97 Through traffic would be diverted to the east or west
before entering Hein Park but "the closing will not make the entire
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity or other property proceeding for redress.
89. 451 U.S. at 102.
90. Id.
91. 610 F.2d at 404. The court of appeals expressly left open the question to what extent
intent is ever an element of the plaintiff's case under section 1982. Id. at 404 n. 13.
92. Id.
93. 451 U.S. at 102-19.
94. Id. at -.
95. Id. at 120-24.
96. Id. at 124-29.
97. Id. at 103. West Drive extends the complete length of the subdivision which is about
one-half mile. Opposite West Drive on the north side of Jackson Avenue is a major thoroughfare,
Springdale Street which serves a large area composed of black citizens. The closing of West Drive
at Jackson Avenue will bar through traffic coming from the north to Overton Park and the down-
town area of Memphis.
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route any longer. ' 98 Local traffic would experience added distance to
the trip from Springdale Avenue to the entrance to Overton Park99 and
would make "access to some homes in Hein Park slightly less
convenient." t 0
As part of its reexamination of the record, the Court reviewed the
city approval of the street closing.' 0 It discussed the City Council
hearing and resolution authorizing the closing. The Court carefully re-
ported and found persuasive the stated reasons for the closing which
were: (1) reduced flow of through traffic using subdivision streets;
(2) increased safety to the many children walking to school in the sub-
division; and (3) reduced traffic pollution in a residential area. 0 2
The Court then engaged in an elaborate review of the record and
history of the litigation. 0 3 The majority concluded that the decision of
the court of appeals was not supported by the record or the district
court findings.'0 4 Rather, the Court decided that the city's decision to
close West Drive was motivated by its interest in protecting the safety
and tranquillity of a residential neighborhood. The majority found the
procedures fair and not affected by any racial or other impermissible
factors. It agreed with the court of appeals that the city had conferred a
benefit on certain white property owners, but found no reason to be-
lieve the city would refuse to confer a comparable benefit on black
property owners if requested to do so. Moreover, the majority found
that the closing did not affect the value of property owned by black
citizens, but admitted it had caused "some slight inconvenience to
98. Id.
99. Overton Park is a 342-acre city park located near the center of Memphis, south of Spr-
ingdale and Hein Park. The park contains a zoo, a nine-hole municipal golf course, an outdoor
theater, nature trails, a bridle path, and an art academy. Id. at 103 n.2.
100. Id. at 103. The majority noted that the area to the north of Hein Park is predominantly
black and that all the homes in Hein Park were owned by whites when the decision to close the
street was made. Id.
101. Id. at 103-04.
102. Id. at 104. The Court accepted the proposition advanced by Petitioner that the city's
decision to close West Drive was motivated by its interest in protecting the safety and tranquillity
of a residential neighborhood.
103. Id. at 105-10. See alo Justice White's concurring opinion which criticized this approach.
Id. at 130.
104. Id. at 115-17. The majority questioned the court of appeals' conclusion that relief under
§ 1982 was required by the facts: (1) that the closing would benefit a white neighborhood and
adversely affect blacks; (2) that a "barrier was to be erected precisely at the point of separation of
these neighborhoods and would... have the effect of limiting contact between them"; (3) that the
closing was not part of a city-wide plan, but rather, was a unique step to protect one neighborhood
from outside influence which the residents considered to be "undesirable"; and (4) that there was
evidence of "an economic depreciation in the property values in the predominantly black residen-
tial area. ... 610 F.2d at 404.
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black motorists."'' 05 The Court concluded that "this slight inconven-
ience" did not constitute a significant impact such as to bring it within
the reach of section 1982.10 6
The second tier of the Court's reasoning process concerned the im-
pact that Davis0 7 and Arlington Heights 0 8 had on this case as the city
had asked the Court to hold Greene's claims under section 1982 and
the thirteenth amendment barred by the absence of proof of discrimi-
natory purpose.1o9 Having noted that those cases held that an absence
of proof of discriminatory intent foreclosed any claim that the city's
action violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the majority considered Memphis' contention that Greene's
claims were likewise barred by the absence of proof of discriminatory
purpose. However, rather than confronting the general question
whether either section 1982 or the thirteenth amendment requires proof
of a specific unlawful purpose, the Court first had to consider the extent
to which either provision applied at all to this street closing case.1 0
The Court briefly reviewed some recent section 1982 cases that
concerned the right of black persons to hold and acquire property on
an equal basis with white persons and the right of blacks not to have
property interests impaired because of their race. I ' The Court con-
cluded that the alleged injury did not involve any impairment to the
kind of property interests which are within the reach of section 1982.112
It noted that the statute would have supported either a challenge to
municipal action benefiting white property owners that would be re-
fused to similarly situated black property owners or, alternatively, the
105. 451 U.S. at 119. The inconvenience was that Springdale residents would have to use a
less direct route to and from their homes.
106. Id. at 120-24.
107. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
108. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
109. 451 U.S. at 119-20.
110. Id. at 120.
111. Id. at 120-22.
112. Id. at 124. The Court carefully distinguished the "restriction" in this case from those that
would "prevent blacks from exercising the same property rights as whites," "severely restricted
access to black homes," or "depreciated the value of property owned by black citizens." Id. at
123.
The absence of such restriction distinguishes this case from the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 15th Cir.] (1974). In Jennings, the defendants
placed a barricade across a street on the outskirts of Dadeville, Ala. and prohibited land-
owners on the other side of the barricade from using the street. All but one of the land-
owners so restricted were black, and the one white landowner was given private access to
the closed street. The street closing had the effect of adding 1 /2 to 2 miles to the trip into
town. The court held that the plaintiffs, "because they are black, have been denied the
right to hold and enjoy their property on the same basis as white citizens." Id. at 442.
Thus Jennings, unlike this case, involved a severe restriction on the access to property.
Id. at 123-24 n.36.
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statute might be violated by official action that depreciated the value of
property owned by black citizens. 1 3 A further violation might occur if
the street closing severely restricted access to black homes because
blacks would then be hampered in the use of their property." 14 How-
ever, the majority decided that the record disclosed none of these re-
strictions. The only injury the Court found was the "requirement that
one public street rather than another must be used for certain trips
within the city."" 1
5
The Court began its examination of Greene's thirteenth amend-
ment argument by reiterating its conclusion that the record disclosed
no racially discriminatory motive on the part of the city council. "16 The
inquiry as to whether the city's conduct violated the thirteenth amend-
ment led the Court to conclude that the impact of the closing was a
"routine burden of citizenship," which was not a violation of the thir-
teenth amendment'1 7 since there was no basis for concluding that the
"interests favored by the city ...were contrived or pretextual."'18
The majority accepted the city's contention that any judicial characteri-
zation of an isolated street closing would constitute the usurpation of a
"law-making power far beyond the imagination of the amendment's
authors."" 19 To regard the consequence of a street closing on a particu-
lar neighborhood as a kind of stigma so severe as to violate the amend-
ment would trivialize its great purpose. 20 Thus, since the majority
113. Id. at 123. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973)
(section 1982 covers a preference to purchase a nontransferable swim club membership); Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (the Court refused to permit enforcement of private covenants impos-
ing racial restrictions on the sale of property); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-22
(1968) (section 1982 encompasses every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (the term "lease" in section 1982 includes an assignable
membership share in recreational facilities).
114. 451 U.S. at 123. The Court noted the absence of severely restricted access and distin-
guished this case from Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974). See text and accompa-
nying note 112 supra.
115. 451 U.S. at 124.
116. Id. at 126 & n.41. See also the Court's comments relative to discriminatory motive at 451
U.S. at 107, 114-16 & nn.22-27.
117. Id. at 129. The Court reasoned that the closing's disparate impact on black citizens could
not be fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery, but as an inconvenience which was a
function of where they live and drive-not a function of their race. The majority termed this
inconvenience a "burden" of citizenship. Id. at 128-29.
118. Id. at 127. The majority found that the record disclosed no racially discriminatory mo-
tive on the part of the city council. Id. at 128.
119. Id. at 124 quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971). In Palmer, the Court
rejected the claim that a city's decision to close public swimming pools rather than desegregate
them violated the thirteenth amendment. The Court noted that § 2 of the Amendment gave Con-
gress the power to eradicate "badges of slavery," and that Congress had not prohibited the chal-
lenged conduct. Id. at 124 n.37.
120. 451 U.S. at 128.
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found neither significant property impairment under section 1982 nor
conduct amounting to a badge of slavery under the thirteenth amend-
ment, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
The Concurring Opinion.- Limitation of the Majority Opinion
Justice White, who submitted a concurring opinion, was the only
member of the Court to examine fully the issue on which certiorari had
been granted. He concurred in the holding of the majority but believed
that the majority had not answered the question posed by the parties:
whether a violation of section 1982 could be established without proof
of discriminatory intent. 12' Justice White stated that this question was
impliedly decided in the affirmative by the Sixth Circuit and that the
petition for certiorari sought review of that precise point.
22
After an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Justice White decided that purposeful discrimina-
tion was "quite clearly the focus" of the legislative proscription; 23 a
violation of section 1982 requires some showing of racial animus.
Thus, according to Justice White, a nonintentional adverse impact
upon black citizens is not a sufficient basis for section 1982 relief.' 24
Having concluded that no racial animus existed, Justice White con-
curred in the judgment of reversal, but would have remanded for fur-
ther proceedings in accord with his opinion. 25 Since Justice White
concluded that the court of appeals judgment was based on section
1982, he found the issue of the reach of the thirteenth amendment not
121. Id. at 130. Justice White stated:
We granted review to answer the question presented in the petition for a writ of
certiorari. The parties in their briefs proceeded on the same assumption. However, in-
stead of addressing the question which was explicitly presented by the findings and hold-
ings below, raised by the petitioners, granted by this Court and briefed by the parties, the
Court inexplicably assumes the role of factflnder, peruses the cold record, rehashes the
evidence, and sua sponie purports to resolve questions that the parties have neither
briefed nor argued.
Id. Justice White pointed to the Court's Rule 21.1 (a) which states that "[o]nly the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court." Id.
122. Id. Justice White further noted that since the Sixth Circuit's judgment was based on
section 1982, the reach of the thirteenth amendment was not properly before the court. Id. at 130
n.2.
123. Id. "[Niothing in the legislative history of this act suggests that Congress was concerned
with facially neutral measures which happened to have an incidental impact on former slaves."
Id. at 134.
124. Id. at 135.
125. Id. Justice White was in favor of remand since the court of appeals proceeded on the
basis that a violation of § 1982 does not require some showing of racial animus or an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race, reversing the district court's judgment without disturbing the
district court's conclusion that no discriminatory purpose had been found. Id. at 129.
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properly before the Court. Therefore, unlike the majority, Justice
White never addressed respondents' thirteenth amendment claim.
The Dissenting Opinion. More Than .4 Simple Street Closing
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented from the majority opinion on two bases: the record 26 and the
legislative history and intent of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.127 Justice Marshall recognized that the key to the majority's con-
clusion was its view of the facts. Therefore, he reexamined and re-
viewed the relevant evidentiary facts in some detail and became
convinced that the court of appeals had been "entirely justified in each
of its conclusions." 2
8
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's notion that the case in-
volved nothing more than a dispute over a city's race-neutral decision
to place a barrier across a road. Rather, he pointed out that more was
at stake than mere "inconvenience"; the "inconvenience" itself sent a
"plain and powerful symbolic message"' 29 to black residents north of
Hein Park-"stay out of the subdivision."'' 30 In addition, a proper
reading of the record demonstrated precisely the kind of evidence of
discriminatory intent the Court had deemed probative in Arlington
Heights.'3 1 The dissent noted that although the majority treated West
126. Id. at 135-47.
127. Id. at 147-55.
128. Id. at 138. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 138.
130. Id. at 139. Black residents testified at trial that this is what they thought the city was
telling them by closing West Drive. Dr. Marvin Feit, a profesor of psychiatry at the University of
Tennessee, predicted that the barrier between West Drive and Springdale Street would reinforce
feelings about the city's "favoritism" toward whites and would "serve as a monument to racial
hostility." Id. at 139.
131. 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977). See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra. See also the trial
testimony of Sarah Terry, an opponent of the closing, interpreted by the dissent to imply that
"undesirable" traffic referred to those Negro drivers who actually used the street. 451 U.S. at 141-
42. Moreover, the testimony of city planning officials strongly suggested that the city, by deviating
from its usual procedures in deciding to close West Drive, violated one guideline ofArlington
Heighs-departures from the normal procedural sequence affording evidence that improper pur-
poses are playing a role. 429 U.S. at 266-68. As Justice Marshall noted:
City officials asserted at trial that there is no requirement that the opinions of af-
fected property owners be solicited before a street is closed, and the District Court found
that there had been no substantial departure from usual practices. But the city's own
application forms state that they must be signed by "[a]ll owners abutting the thorough-
fare to be closed..." At trial, city officials took the position that this language only
refers to individuals owning property abutting at the point of the closing. If that is accu-
rate, then on the city's theory, any two property owners living across a street from one
another could seek to close it and the city would have no obligation to consult any other
residents at all before approving the closing. Put gently, such testimony is contrary to
common sense and not worthy of great deference.
451 U.S. at 143 n.8.
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Drive as just another closing, it was, according to the city official in
charge of closings, the only time the city had ever closed a street for
traffic control purposes, and was undertaken without a comprehensive
city-wide planning effort by the city. 32 This fact and the fact that
Memphis had had a very real history of racial segregation 33 repre-
sented precisely the kind of evidence Arlington Heights 13 4 had deemed
relevant to an inquiry into motivation.
35
The dissent found that substantial harm to respondents' property
rights was demonstrated by the record.' 36 Thus, this injury fell within
the literal language of section 1982 and relevant cases, since the closing
will burden respondents' ability to enjoy their property and depress its
value. 37 Moreover, according to the dissent, the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicated the broad scope of its intended
purpose of eliminating discrimination of the type presented in this situ-
ation. 1 38 Justice Marshall concluded that the closing of West Drive was
forbidden on these facts by section 1982.
39
132. Id. at 143 (reporting the trial testimony of Paul Goldstein, Tr. 297-298, and comments of
the trial judge, Tr. at 313, 321-22).
133. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). In Watson, black residents sued
the city for declaratory and injunctive relief directing immediate desegregation of public parks
and other publicly owned or operated recreational facilities from which blacks were still excluded.
303 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the
continued denial of the use of city facilities to petitioners solely because of their race violated their
constitutional rights. 373 U.S. at 539.
134. It should be noted that Justice Marshall concurred in the Arlington Heights Court's defi-
nition of the proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent exists. 429 U.S.
at 271. However, dissenting in part, he favored remand to the court of appeals to reassess the
significance of the evidence developed in the district court in light of the standards set forth. Id. at
272. Justice Marshall, joining in Justice Brennan's dissent in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
229, deplored Davis which he felt, had "the potential of significantly weakening statutory safe-
guards against discrimination in employment." Id. at 259.
135. 451 U.S. at 144. Additionally, the dissent viewed the combined testimony of Dr. Feit and
real-estate agent Moore as sufficient to demonstrate that the closing of West Drive would cause
genuine harm to the property rights of Negro residents north of Hein Park. Id. at 146 n.12.
136. Id. at 145. "The closing will both burden respondents' ability to enjoy their property and
also depress its value. ... Id. at 148.
137. Id See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973);
Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 314-16 (4th Cir. 1980) (a violation of§ 1982 can be
made out when the challenged action may have an adverse impact on property values in the
future). See also, Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 216 (1971), in which the Court stated, "a city's
possible motivations to ensure safety and save money cannot validate an otherwise impermissible
state action." Id. at 226.
138. 451 U.S. at 149-50. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433 (1968) ("(tjhat
the bill [had] so sweeping an effect ... was disputed by none"). Id. at 433.
139. 451 U.S. at 154 n.18. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's discussion of the
constitutional claim. He posited that since the closing violated § 1982 it was afortiori a violation
of the thirteenth amendment as well. He concluded that the city's action caused harm that
reached the magnitude of a "badge or incident" of slavery, at least as those terms were understood
by the Reconstruction Congress, since that Congress included so many of those who had a hand in
drafting the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 154 n.18.
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In light of his disposition of the statutory question, Justice Mar-
shall noted that ordinarily he would find it unnecessary to consider the
merits of the thirteenth amendment claim. 40 However, in an extended
footnote, he responded to the majority's discussion of the constitutional
claim.' 4 ' In contrast to the majority, Justice Marshall would insist that
the government carry a heavy burden of justification before the Court
should sustain "conduct as egregious as erection of a barrier to prevent
predominantly Negro traffic from entering a historically all-white
neighborhood."' 142 Justice Marshall concluded that the city had not
discharged that burden in this case.
143
ANALYSIS
Interpretation of the Evidence
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions agreed with the
district court's holding that the closure of West Drive in Memphis
would have some impact upon certain black residents, but disagreed as
to the nature and extent of that impact. The majority and Justice
White concluded that the impact-"slight inconvenience" "44-alone
was not sufficient to establish a section 1982 violation. Further, the
majority did not believe this impact so disproportionate as to lead to a
finding of discriminatory intent.' 45 However, Justice Marshall cor-
rectly stated that, even if racial animus was required by the statute, it
was sufficient if the evidence raised an inference of intent and the gov-
ernment failed to rebut it with a sufficiently strong explanation. 46
In drawing inferences from the evidence, the majority purported to
apply the Arlington Heights evidentiary standard 147 to discern racially-
discriminatory intent, 48 but ignored or misinterpreted some very com-
pelling evidence that would have shown discriminatory intent. The
historical background indicated that Memphis had a history of racial






144. Id. at 119. The majority interpreted the record to show that the inconvenience of using
another street was "minimal." Id. at 110.
145. Id. at 114 or 116.
146. Id. at 148 n.14.
147. 429 U.S. at 266-68. See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
148. See references to racially discriminatory motive, 451 U.S. at 106 n.9, 107, 114, 116 & n.27,
126.
149. See Justice Marshall's dissent. 451 U.S. at 143-44. See also text accompanying note 133
supra.
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Furthermore, the record indicated that the closing was sought at the
behest of white residents of Hein Park, 150 and was the only time the city
had ever closed a street for traffic control purposes.' 5
This special sequence of events was clearly suspect according to
the evidentiary standards enunciated in Arlington Heights. There, Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, listed three broad subjects for
proper inquiry to determine whether discriminatory purpose was one
of the motivating factors in the challenged decision. 52 Justice Powell
observed, as did Justice White in Davis, that racial impact might be an
important starting point. Absent extreme racial impact, in most other
situations, the historical background and legislative history of the state
action requires investigation.153 The historical background and se-
quence of events leading up to the Memphis closing certainly raised an
inference of discriminatory purpose under an Arlington Heights
analysis.
Arlington Heights stated that "[diepartures from the normal proce-
dural sequence . . . might afford evidence that improper purposes are
playing a role."'154 The testimony of city planning officials strongly
suggested that Memphis deviated from its usual procedures in deciding
to close West Drive.155 The city's departure from its usual procedures
presented evidence of such "improper purposes." Thus, the evidence
furnished, at minimum, a strong inference of discriminatory intent,
which the majority refused to recognize.
150. 451 U.S. at 103.
151. Id. at 143.
152. 429 U.S. at 266-68.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 267. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff in Arlington Heights has finally
achieved relief, even though it lost its case in the Supreme Court. On December 4, 1980, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the consent decree requiring the village to annex and
rezone a parcel of land for multiple family housing effectuated the Fair Housing Act and judicial
policy favoring settlements. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616
F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980). The consent decree terminated the seven-year Arlington Heights zon-
ing dispute.
155. 451 U.S. at 142-43. Justice Marshall noted:
In particular, despite an unambiguous requirement that applications for street closing be
signed by all owners of property abutting on the thoroughfare to be closed, the city here
permitted this application to go through without the signature or the consent of Sarah
Terry. Perhaps more important, the city gave no notice to the Negro property owners
living north of Hein Park that the Planning Commission was considering an application
to close West Drive. The Planning Commission held its hearing without participation by
any of the affected Negro residents and it declined to let them examine the file on the
West Drive closing. It gave no notice that the City Council would be considering the
issue. When respondents found out about it, they sought to state their case. But the
Council gave opponents of the proposal only 15 minutes, even though some members




The majority abandoned its prior broad construction of the statu-
tory language of section 1982; in the last fourteen years, judicial recog-
nition of the types of discrimination covered by the statute and the
persons protected by it has expanded. 56 There has also been a corre-
sponding increase in the use of the statute as a legal tool to prohibit the
infringement of property rights by racial discrimination. 57 This has
been the legacy of the landmark decision in Jones.
The Court admitted it had broadly construed the language of sec-
tion 1982 to effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute, to protect
not merely the enforceability of property rights acquired by black citi-
zens, but also their rights to acquire and use property on an equal basis
with white citizens.' 58 The Court declined broad construction in this
156. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) and text accompanying notes 14-21 supra. See also District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 422 (1973) ("[L]ike the Amendment upon which it is based,
§ 1982 is not a 'mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding' racial discrimination in
the sale or rental of property but, rather, an 'absolute' bar to all such discrimination, private as
well as public, federal as well as state," citing Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 437) (emphasis in original).
Lower federal courts have also afforded section 1982 a broad construction. See, e.g., McDon-
ald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Recent cases make clear that the [Civil Rights
Act] statutes prohibit all forms of discrimination, sophisticated as well as simpleminded, and thus
disparity of treatment between whites and blacks. . . must receive short shrift from the courts");
Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Racial motivation is
not an element of the § 1982 prima facie case; only a racial impact need be shown."); Jennings v.
Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1974) (where all persons except one who were deprived
of use of a public street by erection of a barricade by white landowners were black, erection of
barrier was actionable under sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act guaranteeing all
persons the same civil rights as those enjoyed by white citizens) (Jennings was distinguished in
Greene, 451 U.S. at 123 n.36.)
157. See, e.g., Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) (landlord liable under
section 1982 and Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., for evicting tenants because they had
entertained black guests in their apartment); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (plain-
tiff alleged a cognizable claim, to wit, that a racially motivated refusal to allow her access to her
property violated section 1982).
158. 451 U.S. at 120.
[In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, the Court refused to permit enforcement of private
covenants imposing racial restrictions on the sale of property even though the legal rights
of blacks to purchase or to sell other property were unimpaired. In Jones. . . we held
that § 1982 "must encompass every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent." 392 U.S.,
at 421-422.. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, we interpreted the term
"lease" in § 1982 to include an assignable membership share in recreational facilities. In
2tlman . 9heaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, we extended that holding to
cover a preference to purchase a nontransferable swim club membership.
Id. at 120-22.
[LJower federal courts have also required plaintiffs alleging a violation of § 1982 to demon-
strate that their property interests have been impaired. See, e.g., Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd.,
632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (right to join a country club was a property interest attached to a
subdivision home); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975) (discriminatory refusal to
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case, since it interpreted the evidence as having shown no sufficient im-
pairment to respondents' property interests. However, there was some
evidence, credited by the district court, and accepted by the Sixth Cir-
cuit, of an economic depreciation in the property values in the
predominantly black residential area with a corresponding increase in
the property values in Hein Park.'5 9 Rejecting this evidence, the ma-
jority refused to consider the inconvenience suffered by drivers north of
Hein Park, commuting to and from their homes, an impairment of
property rights. Obviously, if a white person buys property in Hein
Park, he will have direct access to downtown Memphis, Overton Park
and the public school. If a black person buys property across the street,
in Springdale, he will not have the same direct access and cannot enjoy
the same right to hold and enjoy his property as a white citizen because
the barricade inhibits his ingress to and egress from his property. The
majority's refusal to recognize this is especially shocking considering
the absence of any evidence in the record contradicting the testimony
of respondents' witnesses that property values would fall, indicative of
an adverse impact. 16
0
The evidentiary findings of the District Court and the record in
this case fully support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that black
property owners are likely to suffer economic harm as a result of the
construction of the barrier. In attempting to demonstrate to the trial
court that the closing of West Drive would adversely affect their prop-
erty, respondents first introduced the testimony of Harrell C. Moore, a
real estate agent with seventeen years experience in the field. Moore
began by predicting that after West Drive was closed, Hein Park would
become "more or less a Utopia within the city of Memphis," families
who had left the inner city for the suburbs would probably return in
order to live there, and the property values in Hein Park "would be
enhanced greatly." Moore was then asked what effect the closing
would have on the property values in the Springdale area. He re-
sponded: "From an economic standpoint there would not be a lessen-
ing of value in those properties in the Springdale area, but from a
psychological standpoint, it would have a tendency to have a demoral-
izing effect." At this point, counsel for petitioners interposed an objec-
sell a home); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) (alleged discrimination in
sale of burial plots). But see Gonzales v. Southern Methodist University, 536 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977) (no property interest in law school admission).
159. See Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d at 404.
160. 451 U.S. at 146 n. 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion, but Moore was eventually permitted to answer the question, and
he testified as follows:
In my opinion, with the 17 years experience in the real estate indus-
try, psychologically it would have a deterring, depressing effect on
those individuals who might live north of the Hein Park area...
[A]s a result of such, their moralistic values on their properties could
tend to be such that the upkeep would not be nearly so great and it
could have a detrimental effect on the property values in the
future. 161
Further, respondents' other witness, Dr. Feit, testified that, based
on his experience as Director of Planning for Allegheny County, Pa.,
the shift in traffic patterns as a result of the closing of West Drive
would lower the property values for owners living north of Hein
Park. 162 The combined testimony of these witnesses should have been
sufficient to demonstrate that the street closing would cause genuine
harm to respondent's property rights. The majority conceded that "the
statute might be violated by official action that depreciated the value of
property owned by black citizens."' 63 The violation clearly occurred in
this case, but the majority found no injury, partly because it gave insuf-
ficient weight to expert testimony.
II. Intent
The majority left unanswered the question whether a section 1982
claim is barred by absence of proof of discriminatory purpose. The
Court never reached this issue, as it found no sufficient adverse impact
on respondents' property rights.
However, in his concurrence, Justice White directly addressed the
question since he interpreted the Sixth Circuit decision as implicitly
holding that a section 1982 violation could be established without proof
of discriminatory intent. He rejected this view based upon his under-
standing of the legislative history of the section. 64 Justice White's be-
lief that section 1982 requires proof of purposeful discrimination has
been cited with approval.' 65
However, the plain language of the statute does not suggest an in-
tent requirement; it does not condition a section 1982 violation on the
motivation of any person or persons. Although the legislative history
161. Id. at 145-46.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
164. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
165. See, e.g., Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 986 (3d Cir. 1981). But see (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) 662 F.2d at 1002-03.
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suggests that Congress meant to eradicate both state laws that by their
terms oppressed former slaves and those laws that were enforced with
that goal in mind, nevertheless, the broad statutory language suggests
that this is not all Congress meant to do. 1
66
Given the absence of a congressional declaration of intent to ex-
tend the protection of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 only to effects of
purposeful discrimination, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to
afford no protection against impairment of property interests caused by
the nonintentional conduct. Additionally, a comparison with other
similar statutory remedies for racial discrimination, such as section
1983167 and Title VII,168 which permit an impact standard rather than
an intent standard, lends further weight to the interpretation that sec-
tion 1982 protects against nonintentional as well as intentional
discrimination.
The Constitutional Question
The majority held that the city's closing of West Drive, though it
had a disproportionate impact on black citizens, "could not ...be
fairly characterized as a badge or incident of slavery" violative of the
thirteenth amendment 69 based upon its same view of the facts of the
alleged statutory violation. The Court assumed that the impact was
merely a "routine burden"'170 of citizenship, but neglected to address
the issue of why this burden must fall on black citizens alone. Consid-
ering the Greene record, there was a strong basis for finding a constitu-
tional violation; that the closing was a racial humiliation amounting to
a badge of slavery. The Sixth Circuit and Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Blackmun found such a constitutional violation. The court of ap-
peals noted that the community to be benefited by the closing was and
had been historically white; the territory to be burdened by the closing
was predominantly black. The barrier was to be erected precisely be-
166. 451 U.S. at 148, n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. See NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, A GUIDE TO 1983 62-65
(1979). See also Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 571-73 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
168. See text accompanying notes 49-53 and 65 supra. But see American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982) (seniority systems that unintentionally discriminate are exempt). The
effect of this 5-4 ruling is to make it more difficult to challenge seniority systems as biased. Em-
ployees who claim discrimination in seniority systems must prove intentional discrimination in
order to succeed.
169. 451 U.S. at 126. Cf. The first Justice Harlan's statement in Hodges that "by its own
force, that Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established free-
dom." Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170. 451 U.S. at 129.
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tween these areas, limiting contact between them. The Court con-
cluded that the closing was a "unique step to protect one neighborhood
from outside influences which the residents considered to be 'undesir-
able'."' t 71  This result under the unique circumstances can only be
viewed as "one more of the many humiliations," amounting to a badge
of slavery "which society has historically visited upon blacks."' 172
It is true that not every racially discriminatory act constitutes a
badge of slavery forbidden by the thirteenth amendment. 73 But the
Court recognized long ago that the badges and incidents of slavery-its
burdens and disabilities-included restraints upon those fundamental
rights which are the very essence of civil freedom. 174 The Greene Court
departed significantly from both the letter and spirit of the 1968 Jones
decision. Jones represented judicial acceptance of the broad role in-
tended for the thirteenth amendment by its original supporters.175
When the thirteenth amendment was being debated, supporters, as well
as opponents, acknowledged that it would have the effect of striking
down racial discrimination in a wide variety of areas. 76 The Greene
majority, unlike the Sixth Circuit, refused to equate the burden of the
street closing on black citizens with the kind of racial discrimination
forbidden by the amendment. But a "badge of slavery" is no less a
badge if it is subtle rather than flagrant. Some badges remain today. 1
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171. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 1979).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 402. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). Cf. Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 211 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("racially motivated refusal to hire a
Negro or white babysitter or to admit a Negro or a white to a private association cannot be called
a badge of slavery .. ")
The "badge of slavery" concept refers to Congress' power, under the enabling clause of the
thirteenth amendment, to determine what are the restraints, akin to slavery, upon fundamental
rights and to translate that determination into effective legislation. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968).
174. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (citing The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)). These fundamental rights include the same right to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by whijes. 392 U.S. at 441.
175. See remarks of Sen. Trumbull, note 3 supra. See also Buchanan, The Supreme Court and
the Thirteenth Amendment in the Modern Era, 12 Hous. L. REV. 844 (1975).
176. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. Ist Sess., 1465, 2944, 2962, 2979, 2982-83, 2987.
177. Some badges of slavery remain today. While the institution has been outlawed, it
has remained in the minds and hearts of many white men. Cases which have come to
this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die. We have seen contrivances by
States designed to thwart Negro voting, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268. Negroes have
been excluded over and again from juries solely on account of their race, e.g., Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, or have been forced to sit in segregated seats in courtrooms,
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61. They have been made to attend segregated and inferior
schools, e.g., Brown Y. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, or been denied entrance to
colleges or graduate schools because of their color, e.g., Pennsylvania Y. Board of Trusts,
353 U.S. 230; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629. Negroes have been prosecuted for mar-
rying whites, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I .... They have been forced to live in
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As Justice Marshall 178 and the court of appeals 79 observed, the closing
of West Drive was "one more of the many humiliations which society
has historically visited upon blacks."' 80
It is interesting to note that even though the majority did not find a
sufficient impairment of property rights to state a successful claim
under section 1982, the Court nevertheless addressed the constitutional
question. Since the Court did not find that the harm to blacks was
serious enough to constitute a badge of slavery, it was not necessary to
render a decision on the question whether a violation of the thirteenth
amendment can be established absent a showing of racially discrimina-
tory intent.
In fact, the Court tried to sidestep this issue but began its examina-
tion of respondents' thirteenth amendment argument by reiterating its
conclusion that the record disclosed no racially discriminatory motive
on the part of the city council.' 8' The inference that can be drawn from
this statement is that had the city council acted with discriminatory in-
tent, the Court would have considered this a violation of the amend-
ment. The Court seems to be saying, though somewhat indirectly in
dicta, that a violation of the amendment can occur only when discrimi-
natory purpose is present, thereby aligning the thirteenth amendment
standard of proof with that of the fourteenth amendment.
8 2
However, even if, as the Court seems to imply by its constant ref-
erences to the city's motivation,8 3 proof of improper racial motivation
is a requirement of a thirteenth as well as a fourteenth amendment
claim, the Court should have found such improper purpose. Had it
conducted the Arlington Heights-mandated "sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available," the
Court might well have discerned a "clear pattern, unexplainable on
segregated residential districts, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, and residents of white
neighborhoods have denied them entrance, e.g., Shelley V. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
178. 451 U.S. at 154, n.18. "[Oifficial action causing harm of the magnitude suffered here
plainly qualifies as a 'badge or incident' of slavery, at least as those terms were understood by the
Reconstruction Congress." Id.
179. 610 F.2d at 404. This "racial humiliation not only rises to the level of a badge of slavery
but also affects the right of blacks to hold property in the same manner as other citizens. Id.
180. Id.
181. 451 U.S. at 126. The Court found no basis for concluding that the interests favored by
the city in its decision were "contrived or pretextual." Id. at 127.
182. In fact, respondents requested the Court not to render a decision on the constitutional
issue of intent fearing, perhaps, that the Court would apply its fourteenth amendment intent re-
quirement to the thirteenth amendment, thereby increasing the respondents' burden of proof. See
Brief of Respondent, Greene at 33. The complete set of briefs are on file at the Chicago Bar
Association.
183. See 451 U.S. at 107, 114-16 & nn.22-27, 126.
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grounds other than race" emerging from the effect of the city's ac-
tion. 84 As the Sixth Circuit noted, "the pattern of discrimination here
was indeed 'stark' and . . . a badge of slavery" violative of Greene's
rights under the thirteenth amendment.' 8 '
Significance of the Decision
The Davis 8 6 and Arlington Heights t87 decisions increased the bur-
den of proof for plaintiffs stating claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment. These cases established the proposition that plaintiffs must
prove that a governmental decision maker acted with intent or purpose
to discriminate before facially neutral conduct violates the equal pro-
tection clause. Subsequently, one commentator predicted that plaintiffs
may find an insurmountable burden awaiting them because of the in-
herent difficulties surrounding the proof of specific discriminatory
intent. 188
The Court in Greene impliedly extended the discriminatory intent
requirement to prove a violation of the thirteenth amendment by refus-
ing to broadly construe its intended protection against "conduct as
egregious as erection of a barrier to prevent predominantly-Negro traf-
fic from entering a historically all-white neighborhood."1 89 The Court
also refused to recognize the street closing as an impairment to the
kind of property interest within the reach of section 1982. Faced with
these restrictive interpretations, future plaintiffs may well wonder
whether either the thirteenth amendment or section 1982 affords them
sufficient protection from "the many humiliations which society has
historically visited upon blacks."' 90
If the goal of these laws was to eliminate the effects of subtle in-
stances of discrimination caused by facially neutral procedures, as well
as intended discrimination, then this Court has done the respondents
an injustice. This result cannot be tolerated in a society committed to
racial equality. Greene will have a restrictive impact on civil rights liti-
gants seeking judicial resolution of discriminatory conduct. By its deci-
sion, the Court indicated that it wants to restrict yet another avenue of
access to judicial review for civil rights violations. The Greene Court
184. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
185. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 402 (6th Cir. 1979).
186. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See notes 46-55 supra and accompanying text.
187. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See
notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text.
188. See Discriminatory Intent, supra note 66, at 128.
189. 451 U.S. at 154 n. 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Greene v. The City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 1979).
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sends a powerful message to these plaintiffs and defendants: subtle
forms of discrimination will pass judicial muster.' 9 '
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to insure the abo-
lition of slavery. The Act intended to prohibit all racial diserimination
violative of the letter and spirit of the Act's goal. Between 1948 and
1976 the Supreme Court construed the Act broadly attempting to effec-
tuate the purpose of the Act.
The trio of Davis, Arlington Heights and Greene, taken together,
represent a shift away from broad construction of the Act. The dead-
end street in Memphis will have a deadening effect on judicial resolu-
tion of racial discrimination. After Greene, plaintiffs will have great
difficulty obtaining relief from conduct that damages and stigmatizes a
racially identifiable group of citizens. Official action that has disparate
racial impact will not be considered unlawful, as long as its racial ani-
mus is well-concealed and masked behind "legitimate" interests. The
sanctioning by the Court of the closing of West Drive may very well
signal to white communities all over the country that municipal zoning
power is available to physically exclude "undesirable elements," defin-
able in racial terms, thereby creating a virtually all white oasis.192
Thus, the Greene Court has retreated from the promise the Jones
Court made, that the thirteenth amendment was enacted "to eradicate
the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free."' 93
The dismay and frustration stemming from this broken promise raises
serious questions about race relations in our country. The implications
of judicial disregard of, if not acquiescence in, discriminatory conduct
are critical. As Justice Marshall noted in a recent Court decision, if the
Court "refuses to honor our long-recognized principle that the Consti-
tution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of dis-
191. Civil rights litigants may be more successful if their cases do not reach the Supreme
Court. All of the circuit courts of appeal in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Greene held for plain-
tiffs, finding discriminatory impact sufficient to constitute a violation of their civil rights. See also
Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D.N.D. 1978) (it is not necessary in a racial discrimi-
nation case to make a showing that the action was racially motivated).
192. See BriefAmici Curiae, Affirmative Action Coordinating Center at 2-3, City of Memphis
v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), on file at Chicago Bar Association.
Perhaps relying on the Court's decision in Greene, the wealthy Florida town of Golden Beach
has closed all but one road leading to the rest of Dade County. "Determined to remain a tropical
oasis of privacy and safety .... the residents intend to "keep out criminals, curious tourists from
nearby hotels, joggers, and any Haitian refugees who might land at the northeastern Dade beach
in their flight from poverty." See Chi. Tribune, Oct. 27, 1981 at 1. col. 1.
193. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78, quoting, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
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crimination' it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect
political channels of seeking redress."'
94
GERI J. YONOVER
194. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). See also Miller, End of an Era set back in civil rightsfor blacks, Chi. Trib., Apr. 17, 1982, at
9, col. 4.
